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1Competitiveness - ’corporate grafitti’ invades
economic theory
Even a casual observer of the practice and science of management will not fail to
notice how a continuous flow of  new concepts are born, become fashionable, and
then disappear from management jargon. A recent article in Financial Times (1, p.
10) suggests the term ’corporate grafitti’ - or ’management grafitti’ - to describe the
unthinking use of  buzz-words. Management language is 'opaque, ugly, and cliché-
ridden', FT claims. 'Management grafitti' is intended as the catch-phrase to end all
catch-phrases.
Clearly these 'corporate grafitti' are important not only to the world of business, but
also to the rest of society - largely due to the influence wielded by the people who
employ them. Michael Porter, himself a contributor to corporate grafitti, has issued a
warning to managers against paying too much attentions to the fads -  against what
he calls single-issue management. Luckily, most management grafitti live and die
without ever leaving the spheres of management. Exceptionally, however, the term
competitiveness has taken the leap from management theory to the field of
economics and public policy. Does this mean that public policy theory is starting to
be subject to the same fads as management theory? Apparently, some mainstream
economists are of this opinion. However - although most of the time ill-defined - the
term competitiveness seems to fill a need in public discourse. Does the need for such
a concept reflect a new situation in the world economy? Do we need the term
competitiveness in order to come to grips with increasing globalization (another
grafitti term), or is this a new term for a set of problems which have been around for
a long time?
In this paper I shall argue that, although often misused and mostly ill-defined, the
term competitiveness properly used does describe an important feature in the world
economy. This concept scratches the surface of important issues which are central for
understanding the distribution of wealth, both nationally and globally. In spite of its
fairly recent appearance on the scene, the term competitiveness in my view addresses
issues which have been central in public policy at least during the last 500 years,
albeit under different headings. I shall also argue that competitiveness - properly used
- exposes important weaknesses in the neo-classical economic paradigm. This could
then account for the vehemence with which some mainstream economists attack the
use of the term.
If competitiveness is almost universally regarded as a formula for growth, another
related term -  picking winners - carries with it basically negative connotations. I
shall attempt to show that both the above terms may be new, but that the underlying
issues and the practice behind them are older than economic theory - perhaps as old
as international trade itself. I shall also try to show that the discredited idea of
picking winners is closely connected to the highly fashionable term competitiveness.
In the parlance of today's economic policy-making competitiveness is like
motherhood and apple-pie - few people in their right mind would argue against it.
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Opposition to the term competitiveness seems to fall in 2 categories: The first group
questions competitiveness as the basis for the world economic system. The second
questions the validity of the concept as such. The first category is represented by the
’Group of Lisbon’ - 19 scientists who have put together an interesting document
entitled ’Limits to Competition’ ( 2). The Group of Lisbon raises several questions on
the long-term feasibility of a planet governed by what one of them calls ’The Gospel
of Competitiveness’ (3). The second category group consists mostly of neo-classical
economists who see the term as meaningless.
The use of the word competitiveness flourishes on both sides of the Atlantic. The
term also starts to shows up in the Third World - it is in the process of being
‘globalized’. The overall strategy of the European Union (EU) seems to be centered
around three buzz-words: Competitiveness - conveying a notion of continued wealth
creation, cohesion - the EU term for income distribution, and subsidiarity - the
democratic dimension, implying that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible
level in the hierarchy. Also in the US, competitiveness is decidedly ‘in’. In the US,
however, opposition to the use of the term brings together unexpected allies. The
Clinton administration brought with it what to an outsider looks like the first non-
neoclassical economic advisors to the Presidency for several decades. Predictably -
friction between the neo-classical camp and the 'newcomers' appeared. Robert
Reich's 'high quality jobs' and 'low quality jobs' are not exactly meaningful terms to
neo-classical economists. In a paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of The
American Economic Association, MIT's Paul Krugman twice refers to Robert Reich
as a 'pop internationalist', and somewhat unacademically condemns his Harvard
colleague’s notion of 'high-value sectors' as a silly concept. (4) Faced with such an
unusual degree of academic animosity, it is surprising to find that Krugman and
Reich share the same negative view on the term competitiveness - a term everybody
else seems to love. In his review of Michael Porter's The Competitive Advantage of
Nations (5) Robert Reich opens with a broadside: 'National competitiveness is one of
those rare terms of public discourse to have gone directly from obscurity to
meaninglessness without any intervening period of coherence' (6).  In Krugman's
article quoted above, he concludes that in international economics 'the essential
things to teach students are still the insights of Hume and Ricardo', and 'if we can
teach undergrads to wince when they hear someone talk about ''competitiveness'', we
will have done our nation a great service'. The 'pop internationalist' and the defender
of neo-classical economics have found a rare common ground in their shared dislike
of the term competitiveness.
Competitiveness as a term in international economics
The macro-economic use of the word competitiveness is often not properly defined.
In a micro world, the term is fairly straightforward. A standard definition would be
that  competitiveness refers to the capacity of a firm to compete, grow, and be
profitable in the marketplace. At the macro level, however, the concept becomes
more elusive. Porter (5, p. xii) comments that there is no accepted definition of
competitiveness, and later says that 'The only meaningful concept of competitiveness
at the national level is national productivity' (5, p. 6). This is hardly an operational
definition, since - as we shall see later - there is sometimes little relationship between
absolute level of productivity and national wealth. A recent book carrying the title
European Competitiveness (7, p. 1) sees two distinct uses of the word: one the one
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hand it refers to relative efficiency (dynamically or statically), on the other to relative
international trade performance (market shares, revealed comparative advantage).
Also these definitions seem unsatisfactory . In a 1985 book on US Competitiveness
and in the World Economy, Bruce Scott provides the following definition: ’National
competitiveness refers to a nation state’s ability to produce, distribute, and service
goods in the international economy in competition with goods and services produced
in other countries, and to do so in a way that earns a rising standard of living (8, p.
15, italics added).  The OECD Programme on ’Technology and the Economy’
provides the following definition: ’(Competitiveness) may be defined as the degree to
which, under open market conditions, a country can produce goods and services that
meet the test of foreign competition while simultaneously maintaining and expanding
domestic real income’. (9, p. 237, my italics)
In this paper I shall use the Scott/OECD definition of competitiveness. By this
definition, national competitiveness is limited to activities where ’being competitive’
in the micro sense simultaneously increases the national standard of living. This is in
my view the core of the argument. We may thus say that ’competitiveness’ is
achieved only when the neo-classical ’law’ of factor-price equalization (10, 11) is
being defied. Competitiveness is in my view divorced from the issues of productivity
or efficiency as such. Although it is difficult to be competitive if you are not efficient
and have a high productivity, it is by no means obvious that being the most efficient
producer of an internationally traded product makes a country competitive - i.e.
enables it to raise the standard of living. Some very efficient producers and nations
are desperately poor - they are efficient in products which do not provide
competitiveness in the income-raising meaning of the word. Taking an example: The
most productive manufacturers of base-balls in the world are Haitians. They earn 30
cents an hour. Although the US firms which have their base-balls produced in Haiti
are competitive in the micro-economic sense, base-ball production does not make the
Haitian economy more competitive in our macro-economic use of the word. In spite
of its absolute efficiency and large market share in producing base-balls with the
state-of-the-art technology (needle and thread), Haiti’s standard of living does not
increase.
We can observe that high relative or absolute productivity levels do not necessarily
lead to competitiveness. However, fast changes in the level of productivity do tend to
lead to competitiveness. Behind competitiveness there is a key element of imperfect
competition, and it is of course this imperfect competition which prevents factor-
price equalization. That a firm is competitive in the micro-economic sense, does not
mean that all its activities make the nations where it operates more competitive in the
income-raising macro-economic sense of the term. Being the most efficient in the
’wrong’ activities - the opposite of national competitiveness - leads to ‘negative
development’.
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The conflict between ’competitiveness’ and neo-classical theory - or:
How the world got rich in the ’wrong’ way
Why does a prominent mainstream international economist like Paul Krugman want
all US undergraduates to wince at the mention of the term competitiveness? The term
seems to provoke in him something more than indifference. Why this strong visceral
reaction? One explanation could be the frequently uncritical and ill-defined use of
competitiveness in public discourse. However, I think there are more profound
reasons. The very idea of a nation lifting itself to higher levels of living standards
through competitiveness - being engaged in activities that raise the national living
standards more than other activities - goes directly against the assumptions and
beliefs which form the foundations of the neo-classical economic edifice. This is not
the way economic growth is supposed to take place in the neo-classical model. The
strong reaction against the term seems to be there because the implicit assumptions
behind competitiveness contradict the very core of neo-classical economic thought.
In a world inhabited by ’representative firms’ operating under perfect information and
with no scale effects - the classical assumptions of neo-classical theory  - the term
competitiveness is absolutely meaningless. Thus Krugman’s view of a ’high value
sector’ as being silly. Competitiveness is caused by factors which neo-classical
economics traditionally has assumed away - the term must therefore seem
meaningless.
Both high value sectors and competitiveness come alive, however, in a world where
imperfect information and huge economies of scale create cumulative causations,
path-dependent development and lock-in effects. Economies of scale are at the core
of   globalized competition. Indeed, under the standard assumptions of neo-classical
economic theory it is difficult to find reasons why firms exist at all, even more so for
globalized firms. So, in spite of the often vague and cliché-like use of the term
competitiveness, the word carries with it a core of intuitive understanding which
challenges the very paradigm on which the world economic order rests.
An important problem facing the standard economic theory of today, is that the
countries which grew rich did so in the wrong way. In the neo-classical world,
additional created wealth is supposed to spread through lowered prices. In a world
with perfect information and no economies of scale, there is no room for wealth to be
taken out in any other way. New technology in the form of added capital per worker
increases the output of the economy, and  - under the standard assumptions - this
spreads through the world economy in the form of lowered prices. Both Adam Smith
(12, p. 269) and David Ricardo (13, pp. 46-47) explicitly state that this would be the
effect of improved techniques - prices would fall.
However, as technology progresses a nation can get rich in two very different ways.
One is the mechanism suggested by Smith and Ricardo: technological change only
causes prices to fall. The other way, which is not discussed outside the field of labour
economics, is that an important portion of the benefits from technological change is
being distributed inside the producing nations through higher profits, higher wages,
and higher taxable income overall. I call the first mechanism The Classical Mode of
distribution of economic growth, and the second The Collusive Mode of distribution.
When the first mechanism operates the benefits of technical change are spread
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exclusively to the consumers of goods produced. When the second mechanism
operates, the producer (company and nation) of goods retains an important part of
the benefits of improved productivity. (See 14, for a discussion of this). Only when
the second system is at work - when there is a collusive spread of economic growth -
there is a possibility for discussing competitiveness. Competitiveness in this way can
be seen as the consequences on a national level of what labour economists refer to as
’industry rent’. The core of the competitiveness strategy is to locate industries where
high industry rents exists - where there is a collusive spread of economic growth in
my terminology. Competitiveness - the income-rising effect - is essentially achieved
through appropriation of this rent.
In the static system of neo-classical economics, rent-seeking is seen as a negative
term. In a world where increasing returns to scale, imperfect information, and huge
barriers to entry dominate all industries of any importance, dynamic rent-seeking
seems to be a key factor for economic growth and competitiveness. Being micro-
economically competitive in an industry with perfect information, perfect divisibility
of factors of production, and no scale effects leads to poverty - regardless of the level
of productivity - as we have shown in the Haitian example. High-tech protectionism
is a part of this rent-seeking. The existence and national appropriation of this rent is
the core of competitiveness. This ’industry rent’ is also a central feature of the
mechanisms which prevents factor-price equalization to take place in the world, and
it gives us a hint at why increased globalization seems to be accompanied by larger
income inequalities. Inside the EU this tendency is confirmed, at present more than
60 per cent of EU territory receives subsidies due to their ’underdevelopment’. This
amount comes in addition to the huge redistributional effects of national economic
budgets. The quest for competitiveness seems to necessitate increasing flows of funds
for social cohesion. Originally one main argument for the internal European market
was the reaping of economies of scale. Not unexpectedly, this seems to lead to a
concentration of production - creating  fewer centers and more peripheries, thus
increasing the need for redistribution.
If the increased wealth produced with new technology is, even to a small extent, kept
in the producing country in the form of higher wages and profits, the logical
foundation of our world economic system today would seem to face a serious
challenge. Given that technological progress at any point in time is very unevenly
distributed among different economic activities, the logical result of this is the high-
tech protectionism that we see in practice. Nations attempt to pick winners, i.e. those
activities with the highest potential for an increase in productivity and sales*,
assuming that increasing returns and imperfect information will cause the ’industry
rent’ to stick. Probably the static Ricardian type benefits from trade are more than
outweighed by dynamic ’industry rent’ effects, caused e.g. by increasing returns. On
the other hand, if both trading partners work under increasing returns, this would
again make an even stronger argument for free trade. It is, however, quite easy to
envision situations where free trade would no longer would be the preferred solution.
Recent developments of mainstream economic theory - ’New Growth Theory’ and
’New Trade Theory’ - are approaching an understanding of the very same factors we
discuss here, but from a different angle. As the father of  the ’New Trade Theory’
                                                
*
  I assume that Verdorn’s law will very often be at work.
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Krugman himself has resurrected a key concept from 19th Century national
economic policy ¤  - economies of scale (15). In my view the findings of these ’new’
schools are absolutely compatible both with ’high value sectors’ and
’competitiveness’. If Krugman were to see the quest for competitiveness and for high
value sectors as being the result of the uneven spread across industries of
economies of scale, endogenous technical change, and consequently of positive
hysterisis effects, he would, in my opinion, find that both Robert Reich, the reasoned
competitiveness school, and ’New growth theory’ and ’New Trade Theory’ are indeed
addressing the same issues. One barrier to this theoretical convergence and mutual
understanding is that in spite of the resurrection of economies of scale as an
important factor determining the distribution of world income, Krugman and other
’new trade theorists’ so far seemingly avoid facing the practical consequences of their
own theories.  It is easy to have an understanding for their reluctance. Incorporating
the conclusions of ’new trade theory’ would require a complete overhaul of the world
trading system, and make painfully clear the imperfections of what one US writer
refers to as GATTism. (16). With a view to the problems of the Third World, and
now also the fast erosion of the living standards of the Second World, it still seems
pressing to make this overhaul.
                                                
¤
  Although Krugman seems unaware of its former importance. He only tracks the term back to a 1924
article.
7Grafitti from the past - historical equivalents of
competitiveness
Competitiveness in a Schumpeterian framework
Between the Anglo-Saxon economic theory which presently rules the world and its
predecessors - the theories which in turn built the industrial powers of England,
USA, Germany and Japan - there is very fundamental difference: the desirability of
perfect vs. imperfect competition.
In the Anglo-Saxon neo-classical theory perfect competition is - at the same time - a
core assumption of the system and a prerequisite for the system to deliver what it
promises: factor price equalization under a system of world free trade. In neo-
classical theory economic activities are ’alike’ - all equally good as carriers of
economic development from a nation’s point of view. This is a logical consequence
of the key assumptions of perfect information and constant returns to scale, and a
condition for general equilibrium. The stated goal is that of perfect competition. The
Anglo-Saxon paradigm is neo-classical economics, whereas the alternative
Schumpeterian or evolutionary economics has its roots in the German Historical
Tradition.
One economist - Joseph Alois Schumpeter - provides a bridge from the German
historical school to the world of Anglo-Saxon economic theory. In Anglo-Saxon
economics Schumpeter stands out as being much more original than he is to someone
who has a knowledge of the German historical school of economics. Today
Schumpeterian or evolutionary economics challenges neo-classical economics as an
alternative basis for economic policy-making. Its breakthrough on the policy-making
level was the Technology and Economy Programme (TEP) recently carried out by
the OECD, where the aim was to create a better understanding of the relationship
between technological change and economic growth. In  Schumpeter’s process of
’creative destruction’ waves of innovation hit different industries at different points in
time - providing widely differing entrepreneurial profit across industries. The
industries where high degrees of entrepreneurial profits exist, will also be the
activities which provide competitiveness as this entrepreneurial profit is spread in a
collusive mode and ’trickles down’ in the producing nation. In this way a reasoned
use of the term competitiveness is perfectly compatible with a Schumpeterian world
view.
In the empire-building economic paradigms of the past, economic development was
seen as ’activity specific’ - some economic activities were seen to bring economic
development, others not. (see 14) Economic development in this system was  - stated
in today’s terms - caused by engaging in the economic activities which provided
dynamic imperfect competition. The Schumpeterian creative destruction which
caused growth were historically clustered around few activities at any point in time -
in stone working activities in the stone age and in bronze working activities in the
bronze age. Since the 1500’s the implicit or explicit assumption in economic thinking
was that if a country engaged in the activities experiencing technical change, the
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technological advances would not all have to be given away to customers abroad,
much of it could be kept in the producing nations as profits and higher real wages
which gave a higher standard of living. This reasoning is evident in the
realökonomisch-oriented mercantilists both in England and France, in the philosophy
behind the arguments used by the German cameralists, in the ’American System’
starting around 1820, and in the German historical school. In a Kaldorian sense, the
development economics in the growth period of all the presently industrialised
countries was ’economics without equilibrium’ - a system where shifting clusters of
disequilibrium-producing technical change provided growth. The goal of economic
policy - mostly implicit - was a search for dynamic imperfect competition. In this
connection various concepts or buzz-words - of the likes of competitiveness - were in
use. We shall return to this later in this section, where English, US, German, and
Japanese experiences are treated separately.
The historical economic growth of nations is hardly a history of  free trade or perfect
markets. Even though historically natural protection in the form of very high
transportation costs have served as natural deterrents to trade, no doubt tariffs and
import and export prohibitions have been the most used tools of economic policy in
history. Tariffs were clearly important sources of revenue, but they were also tools
for a wider economic policy.
Using the word ’strategy’ for economic policies of past Centuries is perhaps an overly
ambitious term, but for hundreds of years nations have possessed beliefs and
ideologies on what promoted national welfare. Based on these beliefs economic
policy, heavy interventions in the working of the market were carried out. Just as the
ideology of free trade has been seen as the key mechanism in promoting universal
economic welfare since the second world war, other concepts have dominated earlier.
Often the expression of the policies to follow were as nebulous as today’s
competitiveness - often they were more specifically targeted. Our understanding of
these past policies tends to be built on stereotypes. Hundreds of years of economic
history and economic thought is usually lumped together under the - mostly
derogatory - term ’mercantilism’. Unfortunately - following the example set by Adam
Smith - we tend to discuss only the monetary aspects of mercantilism and other pre-
classical schools of economic thought. The teaching of history of economic thought
seems to lose out in Western countries - unlike in Japan  - and what is left of the
subject tends to become the history of neo-classical economics. The economists who
were actually important for policy-making in the past are mostly lost to us in the
pursuit of the genealogy of neo-classical thought. In the following section we shall
look at the realökonomisch  (non-monetary) aspects of pre-classical - and later ’anti-
classical’ - economic thought in some of the largest and most successful economies
England and the theories of ’good’ and ’bad’ trade
Towards the end of the 15th Century England was a poor nation, heavily indebted to
her Italian bankers. Her main produce was wool. Over a relatively short period,
England went from being a poor periphery of Europe to being 100 years ago what we
today would call the world’s superpower - from being a poor farming country to
possessing a world empire where the sun never set. England’s competitiveness
increased enormously - she increased production and exports and raised the standard
of living considerably, although unevenly.
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This development was not result of  macroeconomic ’laissez faire’. It was seemingly
based on a perception of the economic growth process very different from today’s, I
would even venture to call it a strategy. Seemingly, economic growth was seen as
being activity-specific, it happened in some activities and not in others. It was a
world where 'good' activities caused national wealth - not a world where an abstract
'economy' grows by percentage points. In a less complex environment - without the
bewildering array of new products and new technologies facing us today - I find this
view plausible. Merchants and workers in some activities where wealthier than
others, and pre-Ricardian common sense seems to have reasoned that if lawyers
make more money than lettuce-pickers, a nation of lawyers will be richer than a
nation of lettuce-pickers. Increasing national wealth - competitiveness - was tied to
being active in the 'good' activities. Exporting certain goods was 'good trade' - a term
which recalls Robert Reich's 'high quality jobs'. The economy consisted of activities
which were potentially different - good, bad, so-so. The economy was far from being
a black box inhabited by 'representative firms'.
The core of the English strategy is well captured by German economist Friedrich
List: 'The principle ‘sell manufactured goods, buy raw materials’ has during
centuries been the substitute for a whole theory'. (17, my translation) Manufacturing
was seen as bringing competitiveness - raw materials not. From a neo-classical point
of view this is of course nonsense, but it is difficult to refuse the results of this
strategy - the industrial revolution. Looking at the English cult of manufacturing and
the concepts of 'good' and 'bad' trade in the light of modern innovation theory, the
strategy seems to make sense. The industrial revolution can be visualized as a
process where, following woollen textiles, more and more processes, one by one in a
sequence, were being mechanized, and more and more differentiated products
appeared. The English seems to have picked up the new industries during the period
of transition from being a handicraft into being a manufacturing industry. In this way
they would run down the learning curves faster than their later-starting competitors,
achieve important economies of scale, learning-by-doing, and would build important
barriers to entry for foreign competitors. By concentrating on manufacturing early in
the industrial age the English created an unrivalled national innovation system (18,
19). As a result, pockets of activities working under imperfect competition clustered
in different parts of England as 'growth poles' or Marshallian industrial districts.
Daniel Defoe - who is normally seen as a reliable source in English history - gives us
his account of the origins of England's take-off in his 'Plan of English Commerce' of
1728. By his account, the Tudors - especially Henry VII and Elizabeth I - are to be
credited for England's ascent. Defoe describes how Henry VII - who came to power
in 1485 - had spent his childhood in Burgundy. The wealth he observed there
contrasted sharply with the poverty he later found in England. But, the Prince
observed, the wealth in Burgundy depended totally on the import of English raw
materials: wool and Fuller's earth.* When he came to the throne of England, Henry
employed the pre-Ricardian logic which during later centuries seems to have
dominated, not only in England, but also on the Continent: (Woollen) manufacturers
are rich, producers of raw materials (wool) are poor. Therefore, to get rich and
develop the country, we must promote the production of  (woollen) manufactures.
Selling manufactures is 'good' trade - in today's lingo: it makes us competitive. The
                                                
*
  Silicate of alumina, used in cleansing cloth.
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methods used to start the production of woollen textiles in England starting in 1489
are the same which later became standard features in all presently industrialized
countries: The king ’secretly procured a great many Foreigners, who were perfectly
skill’d in the Manufacture, to come over and instruct his own People here in their
Beginnings’, bounties were paid to entrepreneurs, import duties were raised for
textiles, export duties for raw wool were kept high, and finally, when the English
production capacity was sufficient, the export of raw wool was prohibited.
The theories of ’good’ and ’bad’ trade probably reached its perfection in the 18th
century. Three volumes published in 1721 by Charles King under the title ’The
British Merchant; or, Commerce Preserv’d’ (21) were extremely influential in the
18th Century. King gives an elaborate list of  ’good’ and ’bad’ trade - of what makes a
country competitive. The list is long and detailed, but a basic message is that selling
manufactures is ’good’ trade, importing them is ’bad’ trade. (21, Vol. 1, pp. 1-14)
Selling raw materials - commodities - to import manufactures is 'bad' trade. ‘Bad’
trade today finds its counterpart in Boston Consulting Group’s and Michael Porter’s
‘dog industries’, activities characterized by fragmented market shares and no growth,
i.e. where there is perfect competition. Here Marx, Schumpeter and Porter meet:
perfect competition does not lead to wealth.
Interestingly in Charles King’s scheme, exchanging manufactures for other
manufactures is specifically seen as being beneficial to both trading countries. In a
world where commodities are produced under conditions of diminishing returns, and
where manufactured goods are produced under conditions of  increasing returns,
King's recommendation would make sense. During the last 10 years ‘The New Trade
Theory' has - indirectly and without referring to it - reconfirmed the validity of this
old 'unscientific' and 'superstitious' economic policy. We should also note that an
Italian economist - Antonio Serra - already in 1613 had identified the existence of
increasing returns as an important source of the Venetian wealth.(22, 14)
The English emphasis on manufacturing consisted not only of promoting own
manufacturing, it was important to stop other nations from manufacturing when this
was feasible. In most cases the manufacturing-centered strategy involved preventing
the birth of manufacturing industries in the colonies, which could be done without
causing to much political uproar. However, on some occasions it was seen as
necessary actively to destroy foreign manufacturing in order to promote important
English interests. Prohibiting the prosperous woollen textile manufacturing in Ireland
starting in 1699 and the destruction of the Bengali weaving industry in the early 19th
century are particularly dramatic examples - both with very serious social
consequences - of this side of the strategy. In the terms of today - getting rid of the
Irish woollen industry and the Indian cotton weavers made English industry more
competitive. This aim was also achieved by prohibiting the emigration of skilled
workers - a practice already used by the Venetians under threat of death penalty - and
through prohibiting the export of machinery from England until the 1830’s.
It may be said that the English policies on economic growth truly created a 'national
innovation system'. In a period of time when innovation materialized as a sequence
of mechanizations of manufacturing processes, one very efficient way of maximizing
innovation was to pay bounties to the producers of goods which production was in
the process of being mechanized, and to raise the duties of these goods. We often
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also find a high-tech bias in tariff schedules, even today. In the US of the 1920’s
German dolls with heads made from modern synthetic material were subject to much
higher duties than traditional dolls. Similar patterns are frequently found both in
Japan and elsewhere, but this phenomenon needs to be studied more. Today the EU
external tariff still maintains the basic characteristics of the English mercantilists:
raw material can be imported free of duty, manufactured goods often not. Fish as a
raw material can be imported duty free to the EC, however once breaded, cured or
smoked, it has to pay duty.
’The American System’ -  productive capacity and competitiveness
By the time the early economic policies of the United States were being formed, the
English policy had shifted away from previous strategies. Alexander Hamilton - in
his 1791 ’Report on Manufactures’ - has clearly read Adam Smith and knows the free
trade arguments, but comes down on the side of the previous English strategy:
manufactures are to be encouraged. Hamilton was clearly much more influenced by
the late English mercantilist Malachy Postlethwaith than by Adam Smith. Although
Hamilton provided a favourable attitude towards the protection of manufactures,
tariffs as a permanent ‘American System’ only started in 1819. Seemingly the
'involuntary protection' experienced by the United States by being largely cut off
from trade with Europe during the blockades during the War of 1812 encouraged
enough manufacturing activity to achieve a critical mass of political pressure for
tariffs. This 'involuntary protection' seems to have a parallel in Latin America during
the Second World War.
In this 'American System of Manufactures' Daniel Raymond's 'Thoughts on Political
Economy' provided the first theory. (23) Here tariffs were a permanent part of the
system, not an incidental temporary aid to infant industry. Raymond elaborated much
around the concept of  'productive capacity'. Productive capacity seems to have been
the buzz-word of the day, a parallel to the concept of National Productive Power
which was used in Germany during the same period. Some activities provided more
'productive capacity' and 'productive power' than others - like competitiveness it is
not present to the same degree in all activities. Raymond specifically complains that
'In the Wealth of Nations agriculture, commerce and manufactures are all jumbled
together' (23, p. 132) Just as Serra did in 1613, Raymond implies that different
natural laws apply to different activities.
Raymond points out that England did not get rich by following Adam Smith's
prescriptions, but that it would be in their interest to have other nations following
them: 'That policy which Adam Smith reprobates, and which England has adopted,
must then be considered the cause which has produced the unexampled wealth and
power of England' (23, p. 136) 'It might answer a very good purpose for them, to cry
up his (Adam Smith's) system, that other nations might be gulled by it, but they
never choose to be gulled by it themselves' (23, p. 134).
Responding to the argument that tariffs would raise prices, Raymond claimed that
this was no argument for the nation as a whole. The high prices and favourable
profits would both stimulate businessmen and increase the demand for labour far
beyond the difference in price. We here encounter an important argument which
became part of the 18th Century reasoning:  The increase in prices caused by tariffs
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on manufactures is more  than compensated by the increase in profits and wages in
the protecting country. Man’s two economic roles - as consumers and producers - are
weighed against one another, in a circular-flow type of reasoning. If man- the-wage-
earner is compensated more as a result of the tariff than what man-the-consumer has
to spend additionally on the protected goods, the net effect to him of the tariff is
positive. This argument would be valid if technological developments spreads
collusively - see above - as the result of imperfect competition, externalities, and/or
scale effects. Typically, present economic thinking - having internalized the standard
assumptions of neo-classical theory - focuses exclusively on the interests of man-the-
consumer, which only under perfect competition are identical to those of man-the-
wage-earner.
The literature around the issues of  protection of manufactures in the US is
enormous. Many economists deserve to be mentioned, Matthew and Henry Carey,
John Rae -  perhaps the first author to emphasize invention and technical change -
and Friedrich List, the German political refugee who later was to export ’The
American System’ so successfully to Germany. The result of the debates was a
considerable fluctuation in the level of tariffs during the 19th Century, in the US as
in Europe. This lack of consistency in the tariff level may be seen as a weakness, but
in fact Friedrich List came to recommend this strategy. Turning protection on and off
would keep the local manufacturers ’on their toes’, under constant pressure to
improve both their products and their methods of production. We would say that
such a system insured a continuos flow of process and product innovations. List’s
argument recalls Porter’s emphasis on the need for competition and demanding
customers.
Tariffs and protection were by some - including Friedrich List both during his period
in the US and later - seen as a temporary measure, a measure needed in order to
catch up with England and later forge ahead. Dorfman expresses this vision
particularly well, partly using quotes from List and partly using his own words as
follows:
  
''...free trade is the ideal, and United States will proclaim the true cosmopolitan
principles when the time is ripe. This will be when the United States has a hundred
million people* and the seas are covered with her ships; when American industry
attains the greatest perfection, and New York is the greatest commercial emporium
and Philadelphia the greatest manufacturing city in the world; and 'when no earthly
power can longer resist the American Stars, then our children's children will proclaim
freedom of trade throughout the world, by land and sea'. (24, p. 581)
In this prophetic statement, the English strategy for growth is recreated. If the United
States had the courage to follow the strategy that England had followed, and not the
one she preached at the moment, in the end the United States would surpass the old
master, England.
                                                
*
  The population of the United States passed the 100 Million mark around 1915.
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Germany: Cosmo-political economic theory vs. ’National productive
power’
Whereas early recruitment to the economics profession in England came from the
merchants, the ranks of economists were filled from the public sector in Germany.
German Cameralists - the equivalent of mercantilists - were generally employed as
keepers of the treasury or Schatzkammer - therefore the term cameralists.
The German cameralist literature is huge, but largely unknown outside Germany.
Like the English mercantilists, the cameralists favoured the protection of
manufacturing. An early book recommending the protection of manufacture - a
contemporary of Mun’s and Child’s tracts in England - was Phillipp von Hornick’s
Österreich über alles wann es nur will, first published in 1684. This book went
through 16 editions, more than both Mun and Child. In contrast to England, however,
it is important to notice that Germany consisted of many states, some of them very
small. By the early 19th Century, Germany consisted of about 32 states, each one
extremely protectionist.
Already from the 17th Century we find that English economics books are translated
to many languages including German, but the German books are hardly ever
translated to foreign languages. This means that German economists have access to -
and comment extensively on - both English and French economists, but not vice
versa. There were 7 German editions of Wealth of Nations before 1850, but in spite
of this large diffusion, Smith’s influence on trade and manufacturing policy was, as
in the US, limited.
Friedrich List was the man to provide the theory which lead to the economic
unification of Germany, carried out under the leadership of the Prussian bureaucrats.
Originally a preacher of the doctrines of Adam Smith and J.B. Say, List had
witnessed first hand both the ’admirable’ effect of Napoleon’s ’Continental System’
and of the ’American System of Manufactures’. He had also seen the destructive
effects of free trade in France after the fall of Napoleon. (The ‘herbicide effect’ of
free trade, see 14) To List, Smith was not altogether wrong, but to him the English
economists failed to distinguish between national and universal interests. Their
political economy was a cosmo-political economy, but nations needed to build a
national system of political economy. To this very day, macro-economics is called
Volkswirtshaft or Nationaløkonomi in Germany and Scandinavia as a result of this
reaction to English cosmo-political economics.
List’s version of competitiveness was the term 'National Productive Power', origi-
nating from the German economist Adam Müller (25). Nations must build
Productive Power, and List give examples on how manufacturing creates these
powers and agriculture does not, but he essentially fails to explain why. Using
today’s buzz-words, List clearly explains that ‘manufacturing matters’, but he fails to
explain why this is so. According to List, to free the national productive powers the
internal tariffs in Germany had to be abolished and an external tariff established. In
Germany, List is therefore seen as a free-trader, in the Anglo-Saxon world he is seen
as the incarnation of protectionism. Lists argument for free trade in a larger
geographical area suggests an understanding of  the importance of scale in
manufacturing. In order to create national productive power, List insisted on the
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importance of building railways, using much of the same reasoning now used in
United States in arguments for an electronic superhighway. Thus, in Germany, List is
seen as the ‘father of the national railway system’.
German political economy continued its 'one-way mirror' relationship with the rest of
the world, virtually until the end of the Second World War. Exceptions were
provided by the international spread of List's ideas, by a number of American
teachers of economics who had studied in Germany, but above all by the very strong
influence of German political economy in Japan.
Japan: Doitsugaki economics beats Eigaku economics - twice!
There are two crucial points in the history of Japanese economic policy, two points in
time where a choice of economic strategy has decided the quality of her future: The
Meiji restoration in 1868 and the end of the Second World War in 1945. In both
cases the country has faced a strategic choice between following the
recommendations of one of two schools of economic thought - between what the
Japanese used to call the Eigaku (English) School  - or the German - or Doitsugaki
School. Remarkably, in both cases the German school of thought won the day. On
the first occasion the most influential German economist was Friedrich List, on the
second occasion it was the Austrian Joseph Alois Schumpeter.
Also in Japan the cosmopolitan universality of the English political economists came
under criticism. British economists looked for economic laws that were as universal
as those of the physical sciences, the German historical school accepted that social
and economic sciences were specific to a given time and place. At the time, List's
Japanese translator, Oshima Sadamasu, put it this way:
'If all apples fall to the ground in England, we can presume that all apples will fall
towards the ground in every country of the world. But in the case of politics, law, or
economics, what is suitable to England may not be applicable to France, for nations
may be old or new, strong or weak, and their position, climate, customs and etiquette
are also interconnected' ...... (quoted in 26)
In the founding manifesto of the Japanese National Economic Association from 1890
we again find expressed the importance of building 'national productive power',
recalling the German and American strategies. Oshima saw the logical extension of
Ricardian trade theory that 'agricultural nations must stay agricultural, and industrial
nations must stay industrial' (26, p. 61) However, no fundamentally agricultural
nation had ever managed to build 'productive power'. In the end, productive power
was seen as closely tied to that of national independence. The conclusion was that
manufacturing had to be encouraged.
It was 55 years later, at the end of the Second World War, that Japan again entered
into an intense debate as to her future economic strategy. The officials of The Bank
of Japan were of the opinion that Japan should cultivate low-technology industries
and seek competitive advantage through her low labour costs, following the standard
recommendations of neo-classical economics. The officials of The Ministry of
Industry and Trade (MITI) - armed with the writings of Schumpeter - argued that
Japan should build high technology industries. Again German economic theory -
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with its model of imperfect competition as the engine of economic growth at its core
- won the day. Schumpeterian economics and competitiveness converge around this
core of imperfect competition. In the way competitiveness visualizes growth the
imperfect competition element is implicit, in Schumpeterian economics it is explicit.
No country has embraced Schumpeter like the Japanese have. Schumpeter’s first
book - Wesen und Haupteinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie (27) from 1908
- has appeared in three Japanese editions, the first in 1936. There is still no English
translation, and the only other translation is a recent Italian one. When Schumpeter
was unable to find a job in Europe in the early 1930’s, he was offered a job in Japan.
Before leaving for Japan, however, he was offered another job at the University of
Bonn, which he accepted. But he never forgot the Japanese job offer. Schumpeter’s
own library is now housed in the Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo - formerly Tokyo
School of Commerce - which was established towards the end of the last century
with the Hochschule für Welthandel in Schumpeter's Vienna as a model. Thus, today
the two periods of  doitsugaki economic influence in Japan meet in Schumpeter's
library.
Measuring potential for competitiveness - The Quality Index of
Economic Activities
Historically the presently developed nations have built their competitiveness above
all on manufacturing. In the past, as we have seen, this was achieved by protecting
and aiding manufacturing activities in various ways, thus building a 'national
innovation system' where industry rent could be appropriated by the nation-state.
There is, of course, of course nothing which makes manufacturing  per se valuable.
The key lies in the dynamic imperfect competition which sustains growth, which
historically has been more present in manufacturing than in other economic
activities. Today, many manufacturing industries fail to build competitiveness. On
the other hand, many services - such as engineering and banking - can build
competitiveness, as well as some agricultural products. In the United States rice
seems to be one example. Historically, however, the superior economic activities -
those providing 'national productive power', ‘productive capacity’, and
competitiveness - have overwhelmingly come from the manufacturing sector.
In neo-classical economic theory - as a result of its core assumptions - all economic
activities become 'alike'. The world is inhabited by 'representative firms'. From the
individual entrepreneur's point of view, his firm is unique, at the very least through
its geographical location. There is in my view a challenge to the find an intermediary
level of abstraction between these two extremes - that economic activities are either
'all equal' or 'all unique' - where economic activities may be grouped or categorized
by common characteristics. The 'Quality Index' of economic activities in Table 1 is
an attempt at achieving this goal. The 'Quality Index' ranks economic activities by
their ability to provide competitiveness: their ability to increase a nation's standard of
living while being micro-economically competitive in an open economy. The higher
the score on the quality index, the higher the ability of an activity to raise a nations
standard of living. In Robert Reich’s terms, the index ranks jobs from 'low quality' at
the bottom to 'high quality' on top.
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Table 1. The Quality Index.
The workings of an economic system under perfect competition is described well by
current economic theory. There are also reasonably good theories of monopoly
behaviour. However, in the real world, these two situations hardly ever exist.
Economic theory has little meaningful to say about varying degrees of oligopoly,
although this is clearly an important issue. In my view, this is like having defined
well two extremes, black and white, whereas we have no way to define the
intermediary tones of gray. Most economic activities operate under varying degrees
of imperfect competition, varying degrees of gray to use my analogy. The Quality
Index attempts to establish shades of gray - degrees of ability to raise national
standards of living. Robert Reich’s high quality jobs are clustered towards the top.
The ’dog’ industries in Michael Porter’s and Boston Consulting Group’s portofolio
concepts are found at the bottom. This low-quality area is inhabited by what Tom
McCraw calls peripheral firms, ’labor intensive, managerially thin, and bereft of scale
economies’ (28, p.73). These low-score industries are often important employment-
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creating industries, but they the top-score industries are the wealth-creating industries
from the nation’s point of view. For a further discussion of the index, see (14).
The system must be visualized as a closed one where new activities enter at the top
through new technologies or other forms of innovation. These innovations then fall
towards perfect competition with varying speeds - as a result of variable gravitational
pull. The gravity is also determined by purely static effects, like static economies of
scale, which may make an activity ’stick’ at a high level of quality even in the
absence of new technology. Using an example: From 1850 to 1900 the US shoe
industry experienced a very high productivity increase: man-hours employed per pair
of medium-grade welt oxford shoes fell from 15.5 in 1850 to 1.7 in 1900 (29, p.
271). At this point in time the shoe industry gets a high score on the Quality Index.
As a result of this steep learning curve, the shoe industry provided competitiveness to
the US economy: Real wages rose considerably, but the country was still able to
compete. The nation’s labour-hour terms of trade improved - more hours of labour
from abroad could be exchanged for a smaller number of hours worked at home.
Later, the score of the shoe industry on the Quality Index falls markedly. From 1900
to 1923, man-hours employed per pair fall only from 1.7 to 1.1, and from 1923 to
1936 further from 1.1 to 0.9. This is clearly a very meagre productivity increase
compared to the development from 1850 to 1900. Even though the commodity shoes
slowly ceased to be a high quality activity after 1900, there are still today high
quality niches in the shoe industry. The high scores on the quality index of the niches
in the shoe industry are based on factors like style, fashion, brand, design, or
innovations like in golf shoes or ski boots. ’Shoes the commodity’, however, is now a
low quality activity which has been farmed out to poorer countries. This analysis has
of course much in common with Vernon’s product life cycle model.
The Quality Index represents an attempt to measure, though imperfectly, how
economic activities differ, and to be able to outline the macro-economic
consequences of these differences. At the same time the Index highlights the factors
and mechanisms which cause competitiveness to exist; the factors which enables
some nations to increase their standard of living markedly compared to others under
a system of free trade, contrary to the predictions of mainstream economic theory.
Said simply, the Quality Index measures the degree of imperfect competition - the
degree to which an ’industry rent’ may be achieved and temporarily appropriated by a
nation-state.
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Conclusion - Competitiveness as a proxy for the
pursuit of dynamic imperfect competition
The roots to the competitiveness controversy is already present in Adam Smith. On
the one hand Smith’s ideal was agriculture - only there did he see markets working
nearly perfectly. On the other hand he saw in his age more technical change in
manufacturing, and he speculates that the cause of this may be ’the impossibility of
making so complete and entire a separation of all the different branches of labour
employed in agriculture’ (12, p. 10). Unfortunately Smith fails to see the organi-
sational and distributional implications of this difference in the potential for division
of labour. The very division of labour seems to be a key factor in causing economies
of scale, barriers to entry,  imperfect competition, and consequently variations in the
’quality’ of economic activities. A high degree of  ’division of labour’ causes
imperfect competition - the very foundation for competitiveness the way the term is
used today.
In contrast to Anglo-Saxon mainstream economics, German economics generally
allowed for economic activities to be different. Because some activities provided
’National Productive Power’ or ’Competitiveness’ more than others, 19th century
economists both in Germany, the United States, and Japan saw the need for a
’National System of Political Economy’ as opposed to the English system which they
labelled ’Cosmo-Political Economy’. The underlying reasoning for this distinction is
the same as the reasoning underlying the contemporary use of the term
competitiveness,  i.e. the quest for the imperfect-competition activities - present in
some economic activities and not in others - which raise the standard of living
collusively (not only through falling prices). In a world where economic activities are
qualitatively different, seeking competitiveness is an optimization process for the
nation state.
All presently industrialized countries, starting with England, seems to have grown
with a specific ideology or strategy where the activities providing imperfect
competition has been singled out and protected. These ’good’ activities provided
wealth which trickled down to the rest of the nation - they provided ’national
productive power', ‘productive capacity’ or - as we call it today: 'competitiveness'.
The successful colonies also embarked on the same strategy, often in sharp contrasts
to the official policies of the mother countries. All nations tended to prohibit
manufacturing in the colonies, maximizing the competitiveness of the metropolis in
its trading relations. In the 19th Century, England, who came to dominate all the
'high-quality activities', gradually converted to free trade. A New Zealand colonist
remarks in 1897 that 'The British colonist is scarcely seated in the saddle (before he)
discards all theories of free trade with the outer world and levies high import duties
on every product which his colony is capable of supplying in adequate quantity for
his own needs. He levies these duties even on the products of the country under
whose flag he lives. He believes that only in this way can his new land be made
..prosperous.., and that prosperity so large as this aim implies will not be attainable
while subject to unrestricted competition with the great Capital...' (30, pp. 41-42)
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Up until after WW II nations tended to secure competitiveness - access to the high
quality activities - through the protection of manufactures. The success of the
theories of free trade in the economics profession was not matched in business and
political circles until then. In today’s world with managed free trade, the goals are the
same, but the means more subtle, at least among the triadic countries: Europe, Japan,
and the United States. Typically, however, the industrialized countries have
mechanisms both to protect activities with a high score on the Quality Index and
some of those with a low score, particularly agriculture and fisheries, but for opposite
reasons. In the name of competitiveness - raising national incomes through imperfect
competition - the European Union (EU) supports the Airbus project. In the name of
cohesion (income distribution) the same EU supports its farmers who are engaged in
activities operating closer to perfect competition, unshielded by ’industry rents’ the
way their compatriots in the manufacturing industry are. I have previously referred to
this as ’aggressive’ and ’protective’ protectionism - apparently the same type of
economic policy which in fact are carried out as the result of two entirely different
types of economic and political pressures. (31)
Although the term competitiveness is a fairly new one, it is basically only a new term
for a long-standing ’winner-picking’ exercise, a quest for activities operating under
imperfect competition which can be traced at least as far back as England in the late
15th Century. The tariff policies and other economic measures taken by  the
Republic of Venice show the same characteristics even in earlier Centuries. Until
fairly recently the basic mechanism used to climb the Quality Index was tariffs.
However, once nations have achieved competitiveness in activities with high scores
on the Quality Index, they have (sensibly) turned to free trade. Due to economies of
scale, free trade is clearly beneficial to both parties when products from ’high quality
activities’ are exchanged for others with the same score on the Quality Index, just as
Charles King was claiming in 1721.
The Quality Index attempts to illustrate why manufacturing matters. The whole
process of economic development can be pictured as an ascent towards dynamic
imperfect competition and ‘rents’ on the Quality Index. A similar view is imbedded
in the theories of such diverse authors as Michael Porter, Karl Marx, and Joseph
Schumpeter. Recently we have seen how some nations have achieved high growth by
climbing very fast up the Quality Index with export-oriented production - Korea and
Taiwan would be examples of this. These Asian countries have climbed towards
increased wealth emphasizing exports, to a large extent based on the electronics
industry. If we are to consider the present acute situation of the de-industrializing
Eastern block and the increasing poverty in much of the Third World, what would be
the policy implications of the historical strategies for competitiveness?  The
successful export-oriented high growth countries of South East Asia only represent
about 2 per cent of the Third World population. It seems doubtful that the remaining
98 % - Billions of people - in the Third World will be able to climb the Quality Index
by exporting electronics or other high-tech products to the industrialized world. The
historical growth strategies of the presently industrialized countries - how they
climbed the Quality Index and achieved national productive power - competitiveness
- are clearly also worth studying as an alternative strategy.
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